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Abstract
Residential segregation is a key public policy issue that is driven by economic fac-
tors on the one side, and individual attitudes towards ethnic diversity on the other
side. We assume a modeling framework that consists of a population of two ethnic
groups, a rental market for each neighborhood, and household’s utility which depends
on consumption and housing. Accounting for income disparities and heterogeneous
preferences for living in ethnically diverse neighborhoods, we examine the residential
segregation patterns that occur when households make their neighborhood choice by
taking economic and diversity related aspects into account. The investigation reveals
that ethnic income disparities and heterogeneous preferences are antagonistic forces
such that a certain level of income stratification is the price for residential integra-
tion. In light of these findings, we discuss to which extent and under which conditions
housing subsidy policies can favor residential integration.
Keywords: Residential segregation; Ethnic income disparities; Housing subsidies; Evolu-
tionary dynamics. JEL codes: C73, C63, R23, J15, I30.
1 Introduction
Many metropolitan centers in Western Europe and the USA exhibit substantial levels of
residential segregation by ethnicity. Extreme segregation can have a negative impact on
the economic system and is therefore often considered as a serious threat to social stability.
The most important public economic issues related to residential segregation include school
quality and accessibility of education (see, e.g, Nechyba, 2003), underachievement and disad-
vantages in the labor market (see, e.g, Wilson, 1996), difficulties in public health assistance
(see, e.g., Baughman, 2004) and inequality in the supply of public goods (see, e.g., Brender,
2005). Residential segregation is thereby not only detrimental to the residents of segregated
districts but also to the welfare of the entire metropolitan population as it affects the lo-
cal short- and long-term growth negatively (e.g. Li et al., 2013). Beside these traditional
public economic aspects, a number of related public policy issues have emerged in the last
few years, such as a lack of shared language, cultural values and norms. This makes social
cohesion and coordination more difficult and the whole idea of a peaceful society with its
constitutional and civic liberties at risk (see, e.g., Scheffer, 2000; Pancs and Vriend, 2007).
The problem of residential segregation by ethnicity has attracted scholars’ attention and
already several decades ago Thomas Schelling pointed out that the driving forces behind
persistent segregation are many and include both individual preferences for ethnic diversity
and economic aspects (see Schelling, 1969, 1971). Since then, a burgeoning area of research
has focused on studying the effect of ethnic factors such as limited levels of tolerance towards
other ethnic groups in order to explain the phenomenon of residential segregation. These
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contributions include spacial proximity models (e.g. Zhang, 2004, 2011) and game-theoretical
models (e.g. Bischi and Merlone, 2011), and they reveal that even strong preferences for
integration at the individual level produce residential segregation patterns at the macro
level. This remarkable result is confirmed in many other contributions, among which we
mention Pancs and Vriend (2007), where residential segregation is proved to occur even when
households have a strict preference for integration, Fagiolo et al. (2007), where segregation is
observed even in proximity models in which households interact under general social network
structures, and Radi and Gardini (2018), where residential segregation is observed under
heterogeneous preferences for ethnic integration.
In general, the dynamical Schelling-type models of segregation do not account for eco-
nomic aspects that may also drive the decentralized dynamics of neighborhood choices –
although the link between ethnic and economic segregation is empirically well documented
(e.g. Borjas, 1998; Massey et al., 2009). Concerning economic drivers of residential segre-
gation, there is a large body of literature on the sorting of neighborhoods when individuals
differ with respect to their incomes. Empirical evidences suggest that segregation by in-
come has become a common urban pattern in Western societies in the last decades where
this increase can be explained by growing inequality (see, e.g., Watson, 2009). The neigh-
borhood sorting is thereby typically on the basis of neighborhood characteristics such as
local taxation and the provision of public goods (see, e.g., Watson, 2006; Epple and Platt,
1998). A strand of this literature argues that persistent ethnic income disparities, by them-
selves, generate segregation by ethnicity as many minority group members, because of their
socioeconomic status, cannot afford to live in aﬄuent neighborhoods. At the same time,
individuals convert socioeconomic gains into higher quality housing, often by leaving neigh-
borhoods populated by ethnic minorities (see Charles, 2003; Iceland and Wilkes, 2006, for
discussions of the so-called spatial assimilation theory). According to this intuition, how-
ever, the level of residential segregation should have decreased with narrowing ethnic income
disparities as observed in the last years. But residential segregation by ethnicity remains a
striking feature of the urbane landscape such that this intuition does not find confirmation
in reality (see, e.g., Reardon et al., 2015).
In light of these theoretical contributions and empirical evidences, we present in this
paper a dynamic framework that introduces both, ethnic and economic aspects in the res-
idential choices of households. We use a dynamic evolutionary model to demonstrate how
ethnic and economic factors may interact and thereby shape residential outcomes. Our main
finding is that, if income and preferences for integration are correlated with ethnicity in a
way that members of the on average less aﬄuent ethnic group have higher preferences for di-
verse neighborhoods, then ethnic and economic drivers of segregation are antagonistic forces
that either let the more tolerant or the more aﬄuent ethnic group prevail in an initially
integrated neighborhood in the long run. But in cases when the Schelling-type dynamics
and the economic dynamics driven by ethnic income stratification are well balanced such
that they offset each other, then the interaction of the drivers of segregation can give rise
to ethnic integration. In such a situation, narrowing ethnic income gaps that weaken the
economic driver of segregation can lead to more segregation, which is consistent with the
persistence in segregation despite narrowing income disparities observed in recent years.
Our second main finding is that income gaps that generate almost perfectly mixed neigh-
borhoods represent tipping points at which small perturbations of the income gap can tip
the residential outcome from perfect integration into full segregation and vica versa. Our
two main findings bear stark policy implications as we show that specific housing subsidies
applied to support low-income households have similar effects as narrowing ethnic income
disparities. Hence, under certain circumstances, the introduction of housing subsidies can
either transform a fully segregated neighborhood into an almost perfectly integrated one, or
they decrease the degree of integration and can even lead to full segregation.
Our work is closely related to two streams of the theoretical literature on neighbor-
hood sorting. On the one hand, there is the dynamic literature on residential segregation
descended from Schelling (1969, 1971) as outlined above. On the other hand, there is a liter-
ature that considers static equilibrium models of neighborhood choice that take account of
economic aspects by incorporating market adjustments of rents. Some contributions in this
literature highlight the importance of prejudice or discriminatory motives for the emergence
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of segregated neighborhoods (see, e.g., Anas, 2002; Yinger, 1976; Kern, 1981). However,
empirical evidences for the US suggest that preferences for fully segregated neighborhoods
have substantially decreased in the last decades, and nowadays the desired neighborhood
composition is characterized by some degree of integration with a bias towards members of
the own group (see, e.g., Clark, 2009; Charles, 2003; Schuman et al., 1997). Furthermore,
after the passage of the Fair Housing Act in 1968 and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
in 1975 in the US, discriminatory housing practices are unlawful, at least in theory. Hence,
the question arises whether prejudice and housing market discrimination can still explain
why segregation has not decreased with narrowing ethnic income disparities. Sethi and So-
manathan (2004) respond to this critique and propose a static equilibrium framework in
which households sort neighborhoods on the basis of their own preferences for the ethnic
composition of the district, the price of rents, and the average income of residents. They
find that a narrowing ethnic income gap is consistent with extreme and even rising levels of
segregation in cities. Our paper confirms this result.
We contribute to the theoretical literature on residential segregation by linking the static
equilibrium approach that takes into account economic and ethnic aspects of the neighbor-
hood choice to the dynamic Schelling-type literature. This allows to identify tipping points
in the interaction of ethnic and economic divers of segregation. At the same time, the dy-
namic approach allows us to discuss the stability other than the existence of an equilibrium
of integration, thereby highlighting a trade off between the equilibrium-level of integration
and the stability of the equilibrium itself. Focusing on the convergence towards the equilib-
rium, the dynamic approach underlines the fragility of an equilibrium of integration due to
the co-existence of an always-stable equilibrium of segregation.
Moreover, we address the dynamic impact of public housing policies on residential seg-
regation, an issue that has not received much attention in the theoretical literature. In fact,
there is a tremendous variety of housing policies across different countries but a cornerstone
of most of those programs is to provide support for low-income households in the rental
market. Some of these housing policies, however, cause residential segregation by default.
In the US, this is the case for supply-side housing assistance programs which subsidize the
construction and operation of housing projects for less aﬄuent households. Given the still
persistent correlation between income and ethnicity, this policy might imply to subsidize
the emergence of segregated neighborhoods by construction. To overcome this issue, differ-
ent housing subsidy schemes have been designed in form of the so-called rental assistance
programs which aim at subsidizing the cost of rentals for low-income households in the
private rental market (see, e.g., Anderson et al., 2003; McCarty et al., 2014). The aim of
these policies is to assure affordable houses for low-income families without impacting their
residential location choices. However, implementing those assistance programs can lead to
distortions at the housing market and it is not clear to which extent these distortions affect
the residential pattern.
The modeling framework developed to address these issues consists of two populations
that make repeated residential decisions and differ with respect to their ethnic traits, pref-
erences for ethnic diversity and mean income. The first population is on average wealthier
while the second one is more attracted by ethnic diversity in a residential context. The
residential choice of the two household groups depends on the attractiveness of ethnically
integrated residential districts for both groups, which is expressed by the payoff achieved by
households who are living in the district in relation to the payoff of some outside option. The
neighborhood entry and exit decision of households is made on the basis of information about
the relative payoff of the neighborhood which has been collected via direct communication
within the group. On the one hand, these payoffs take into account the economic utility from
spending the income for consumption and housing, where the local housing price is endoge-
nously determined by the average aﬄuence of the neighborhood; on the other hand, they
incorporate the level of ethnic diversity where all households have a higher preference for
integrated over segregated neighborhoods, which is consistent with empirical observations.
Methodologically, we use a two-stage approach. In a first step, we develop a determin-
istic evolutionary model of residential segregation represented by a one-dimensional map
in discrete time. The underlying replicator-like dynamics is based on the assumption that
heterogeneity only occurs across but not within sub populations. This population-based for-
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mulation allows us to characterize the behavior of the model analytically and to compute the
equilibria numerically. In a second step, we follow an agent-based approach to simulate the
same environment but including inequality within sub populations. The comparison of the
agent-based approach and the deterministic evolutionary game approach using a common
theoretical framework as a basis enables us to explore the long-term residential pattern in a
highly stylized environment from an analytical perspective and then to check the robustness
of these findings by simulating the agent-based model under more realistic assumptions by,
e.g., incorporating a more realistic income distribution. For further discussions on the rela-
tionship between evolutionary games and the agent-based approach, see, e.g., Adami et al.
(2016); Dawid (2007); Carpenter (2002).
The road map of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the game-theoretical
model in a highly stylized environment and discusses the assumptions. Section 3 shows that
residential integration occurs when there is a mix of income inequality and heterogeneous
individual preferences for integration. Moreover, it focuses on the policy measure introduced
to subsidize housing of low-income households and the related implications in terms of
residential segregation. Section 4 generalizes the framework by adopting an agent-based
approach that includes income stratification within ethnic groups. Simulations of the agent-
based model illustrate that the implications obtained from the stylized game-theoretical
model are robust. Section 5 concludes. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Households live in a metropolitan area and can be classified into two groups i ∈ {1, 2} based
on ethnicity. Besides these different ethnic backgrounds, we assume that the two groups
can be distinguished by income and their propensity towards ethnic diversity in households’
residential environment. In particular, the members of the first population are the wealthier
ones while the members of the second population are the more tolerant ones toward no-like
neighbors. A household sorts at each time t ∈ N between a set of segregated neighborhoods,
where there are only like-type habitants, and a set of integrated neighborhoods in which the
ethnic composition is an endogenous variable that evolves over time. Thus, the model takes
the form of a multiple-neighborhood model, where each household has always the possibility
to choose to live in segregated neighborhoods with co-ethnic neighbors as a sort of outside
option. This modeling choice is motivated by the current high levels of residential segregation
that makes the outside option realistic and always offers households the possibility to choose
the totally segregated solution.
More precisely, we consider a city with an undefined number of neighborhoods and we
assume a urban density equilibrium in the allocation of habitants such that each neighbor-
hood has a population normalized to one. Let n1,t denote the number of households of the
first group that live in an integrated district at time t and let n2,t denote the number of
households of the second group that live in an integrated district at time t. Then, the ethnic
composition of an integrated neighborhood is given by xt = n1,t/ (n1,t + n2,t). The fitness
of a household of type i that lives in an integrated neighborhood is Πi (xt) while the fitness
of the same household that lives in a segregated neighborhood is δi.
The evolution of residential patterns is driven by the flow of information generated by
a word-of-mouth communication, see, e.g., Bischi et al. (2003). Specifically, at each time
t ∈ N, a household living in an integrated neighborhood samples a like-type household from a
segregated neighborhood and they exchange information about their current relative payoffs.
A household changes his/her residential location anytime his/her fitness is lower than the
one of the sampled household. The relative fitness is affected by idiosyncratic preferences
which are measured by a random variable εt. It follows that P (Πi (xt) < δi + εt) is the
probability that a household living in an integrated neighborhood changes his/her residential
location choice and P (Πi (xt) > δi + εt) is the probability that a household from a segregated
neighborhood moves to an integrated location. Let Θ be the cumulative distribution function
of the random variable εt, then the number of households of type i that live in an integrated
neighborhood evolves according to the following difference equation:
ni,t+1 = 2Θ (Πi (xt)− δi)ni,t. (1)
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In the following we assume that εt is a continuous random variable which follows a logistic
distribution with zero mean, i.e.
Θ (Πi (xt)− δi) = 1
1 + exp (β (δi −Πi (xt))) (2)
where 1/β is the scale parameter proportional to the standard deviation. Hence, the dynamic
Equation (1) indicates that the number of members of population i that live in an integrated
district increases whenever living in an integrated neighborhood offers to an agent of type
i a higher payoff than living in a segregated neighborhood, while it remains constant when
the two payoffs are equal and it decreases otherwise.
Living in a neighborhood implies renting a house, where the price of a housing unit is
denoted by ps. Moreover, ωi is the budget of an agent of type i, where we assume ω1 ≥ ω2.
Then at each time t ∈ N his/her housing demand, which we denote by si, solves the following
optimization problem:
(si, zi) = arg maxs,z U (s, z)
s. t.
pzz + pss = ωi
s ≥ 0; z ≥ 0
(3)
where U is households’ utility function, zi is the demand of the all of the consumption goods
at a constant price pz and the equality constraint represents the budget equation. Assuming
the following Cobb-Douglas utility function:
U (s, z) = sαz1−α (4)
with α ∈ (0, 1) and solving optimization problem (3), we obtain the Walrasian demand
functions for houses and consumption goods, respectively,
si (ps) =
αωi
ps
and zi (pz) =
(1− α)ωi
pz
(5)
from which we observe that the parameter α measures the fraction of nominal income spent
on housing. Note that Cobb-Douglas preferences for consumption and housing are common
assumptions in recent macroeconomic models studying housing, see, e.g., Davis and Heath-
cote (2005), Iacoviello (2005), Kiyotaki et al. (2011) and Davis and Ortalo-Magne´ (2011).
In fact, as revealed by empirical analysis, these assumptions allow to capture the two main
striking features of the housing market, which are a constant expenditure share on housing
and a certain degree of complementary in utility between consumption goods and houses. In
the following, for the sake of computational simplicity, we assume α = 0.5. Moreover, we as-
sume that the price of the consumption goods is exogenously given and is normalized to one.
On the other hand, the housing price is endogenously determined according to the classical
market clearing mechanism and solves the following price equation for each neighborhood:
s1 (ps)xt + s2 (ps) (1− xt) = c (6)
where c is the supply of houses. Without loss of generality, it is normalized to 1. It follows
that
ps (xt) =
ω1xt + ω2 (1− xt)
2
. (7)
It should be noted that Equation (7) implies that the market price of a house in a district
depends on the ethnic composition of the district itself. In particular, the larger is the
fraction of households of type 1, the higher is the price that residents pay for a house. This
is because agents of type 1 are the more aﬄuent households and therefore their presence
implies a larger housing demand that drives up the market price. Given the market clearing
price, the demands for houses are
s1 (ps (xt)) =
ω1
ω1xt + ω2 (1− xt) and s2 (ps (xt)) =
ω2
ω1xt + ω2 (1− xt) . (8)
5
From the optimal choices of household i with respect to housing and consumption, one can
derive the indirect utility function which is
Vi (xt) =
ωi√
2 (ω1xt + ω2 (1− xt))
. (9)
Besides the economic utility, a household cares about the ethnic composition of the
neighborhood where preferences for integration are represented by an unimodal function
fi (x). Similarly to Zhang (2004) and Pancs and Vriend (2007), we assume a maximum
satisfaction level when the neighborhood is perfectly integrated, i.e. x = 0.5. Furthermore,
each household has a bias in favor of agents of the same kind, hence f1 (1), f2 (0) > 0.
This bias implies that, although people do not prefer segregated neighborhoods, they feel
better if they belong to the majority group rather than the minority group. The particular
case of a segregated neighborhood only inhabited by unlike agents is associated with a zero
preference, i.e. f1 (0) = f2 (1) = 0. Formally, we assume
f1 (x) =
 2x 0 ≤ x ≤
1
2
(2− d)− 2 (1− d)x 12 < x ≤ 1
and f2 (x) = bf1 (1− x) (10)
where b ≥ 1 and d ∈ [0, 1). Here, parameter b measures the relative importance of integration
between group 1 and group 2, in particular the condition b > 1 indicates that, consistently
with empirical evidences, see, e.g., Clark (1991) and Schuman et al. (1997), one group
appreciates equally ethnically-mixed neighborhoods more than the other group. At the
same time, parameter d measures the bias toward members of one’s own group, see e.g.
Charles (2003).
The overall fitness of a household generated by living in a certain neighborhood is then
given by a combination of economic utility and his/her satisfaction from the ethnic composi-
tion in the neighborhood. Let the parameter η measure the relative importance of individual
preferences for integration over economic utility, it follows that the fitness measure of an
agent of type i is given by
Πi (xt) = Vi (xt) + ηfi (xt) . (11)
Notably, the fitness depends only on the ethnic composition of the neighborhood which,
consistently with the dynamics of n1,t and n2,t in (1), evolves according to the following
population-based evolutionary process:
xt+1 =
xt
xt + (1− xt) 1+exp(β(δ1−Π1(xt)))1+exp(β(δ2−Π2(xt)))
(12)
where δ1 is equal to Π1 (1) and δ2 is equal to Π2 (0) and the parameter space Φ is given by:
Assumption 1 Φ = { (b, d, η, ω1, ω2, β)| b ≥ 1, d ∈ (0, 1) , η ≥ 0, ω1 ≥ ω2 ≥ 0 and β > 0}
Considering the parameter space defined as in Assumption 1, Model (12) is characterized
by few general features that are summarized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Consider the parameter space Φ defined in Assumption 1 and define
∆Π (x) = δ1 −Π1 (x)− δ2 + Π2 (x) . (13)
Then the model in (12) is such that:
1. xt+1 > xt ∀xt ∈ (0, 1) s.t. ∆Π (xt) < 0 and xt+1 < xt ∀xt ∈ (0, 1) s.t. ∆Π (xt) > 0;
2. The set [0, 1] is invariant (xt+1 ∈ [0, 1] for whatever t ≥ 0 and xt ∈ [0, 1]);
3. xS0 = 0 and x
S
1 = 1 are equilibria representing segregation;
4. x∗ ∈ (0, 1) is an equilibrium if and only if ∆Π (x∗) = 0.
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It should be noted that Equation (12) is a replicator-type dynamics that is, however,
different from the replicator dynamics in the classical sense as put forward in, e.g., Hofbauer
and Sigmund (2003). In fact, Equation (12) is the result of decision processes of two sepa-
rated groups of individuals each of which has two strategies available. Instead, the classical
replicator dynamics simulates either the Darwinian selection of species or the selection of
strategies by a single population. Despite these differences, both mechanisms have in com-
mon that selection is driven by the relative performance of the strategies. This similarity
implies that the results that follow for Model (12) would still hold true even if we adopted a
replicator dynamics such as the exponential one employed, e.g., in Radi and Gardini (2018)
to study segregation patterns in a Schelling-type model. Differently from the modeling setup
employed in Radi and Gardini (2018), the dynamic Equation (12) allows a straightforward
generalization to the agent-based setup as we will see later.
3 The Dynamic Patterns of Integration and Segregation
3.1 Economic and Ethnic Segregation
The model outlined in the previous section represents a deterministic evolutionary game
in discrete time. In this section, we analyze the long-term behavior of this evolutionary
game with respect to possible steady state levels of ethnic diversity x. Model (12) indicates
that the ethnic composition of a neighborhood evolves over time according to a difference
equation on the subspace [0, 1], which is an invariant region. Segregation occurs either when
the neighborhood is populated by members of population 1 only, or when the neighborhood
is populated by members of population 2 only. These two residential layouts are steady
states of the model and are indicated by xS1 = 1 and x
S
0 = 0, respectively. Consistently with
the previous findings, see, e.g., Schelling (1971), Pancs and Vriend (2007) and Bischi and
Merlone (2011), integration is extremely fragile and these equilibria of segregation are the
unique asymptotically stable long run location patterns when there is no income inequality
but heterogeneous distributions of tolerances/preferences toward unlike neighbors.
Theorem 1 (Ethnic segregation) Consider Model (12) with η > 0 and b > 1 and without
ethnic income inequality, i.e. ω1 = ω2. Then, segregation is the only stable location pattern.
The residential segregation driven by heterogeneous distribution of tolerances/preferences
is denoted ethnic segregation. The other form, or dimension, of residential segregation ac-
counted by the model is segregation by income, also known as economic segregation, which
occurs when wealthy people live in aﬄuent neighborhoods and poor people live in lower-
income neighborhoods, see, e.g., Anderson et al. (2003) and Watson (2009). Considering
this second dimension of residential segregation only, the model forecasts metropolitan areas
divided in wealthy neighborhoods and low-income neighborhoods.
Theorem 2 (Economic segregation) Consider Model (12) with η = 0 and ω1 > ω2.
Then, an initially integrated neighborhood will be populated by the wealthy population only
in the long run.
Summarizing, excluding income inequalities, the coexistence of different ethnic groups in
the same neighborhood is not possible because in the long run the group prevails that records
the highest level of satisfaction with the current composition of the neighborhood. Similarly,
excluding ethnic preferences, the coexistence of wealthy and poor people is threatened by
the inflow of the more aﬄuent people.
3.2 The Combined Effect of Economic and Ethnic Segregation
In Theorem 1 and 2 we pointed out that there exist two different forces potentially driving
the long-term dynamics of the model towards residential segregation. On the one hand, there
is ethnic segregation that is mainly driven by relative differences in terms of preferences for
integration between the two groups; on the other hand, there is economic segregation which is
driven by ethnic income differentials. Although this sounds like a definitive condemnation to
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segregation, the question can be asked whether there is also room for residential integration
stemming from the negative correlation between income and preference for integration at the
ethnic level. In order to answer this question, we first describe a numerical analysis of subsets
of the parameter space. Based on these numerical exercises, in what follows, we characterize
the global dynamics of the system graphically by means of bifurcation diagrams, in which
the attractors towards which the dynamical system tends to evolve in the long run and the
corresponding basins of attraction are depicted as functions of a bifurcation parameter (on
the horizontal axis) and initial levels of integration x0 ∈ [0, 1.0] (on the vertical axis).
In Figure 1 we show those bifurcation diagrams for each of the four permutations of
b ∈ {1.5, 2.0} and η ∈ {0.25, 1.0}, where b represents the relative importance of integration
between group 1 and 2 and η indicates the general weight both types of agents put on
integration compared to economic utility. Here we use the ethnic income gap ω2 with
0 < ω2 ≤ ω1 = 1.0 as bifurcation parameter, where this parameter can be interpreted as the
strength towards economic segregation.
Generally speaking, one can observe that, depending on the initial conditions and pa-
rameter choices, either ethnic segregation or integration can be a stable long-term outcome
where both, the drivers of ethnic and economic segregation, can have a substantial impact
on the long-term dynamics of the model. To be more precise, let us first consider the case in
which both types of households put only low weight on their individual preferences for inte-
gration, i.e. η = 0.25 (upper panels of Figure 1). Apparently, there are only mild qualitative
differences between b = 1.5 and b = 2.0 whereas a variation of the income level ω2 changes
the long-term behavior substantially. In particular, a sufficiently high level of ethnic income
inequality drives the initial sub population of the less aﬄuent households of type 2 out of
the previously integrated neighborhoods. Thus, in scenarios in which the gap between ω2
and ω1 is sufficiently large, economic segregation dominates thereby preventing integration
in the long run. Intuitively, this occurs because wealthy households of type 1 have higher
incentives to enter mixed-neighborhoods that offer lower housing prices compared to those
neighborhoods that are entirely populated by their co-ethnic fellows. A higher share of
high-income households in turn increases the housing prices of the ethnically diverse neigh-
borhoods making them less attractive for household of type 2, which is consistent with a
common gentrification pattern (see, e.g., Helms, 2003; Smith, 1996).
But what happens if the ethnic income gap narrows? Then, one can observe a sub-
stantial change in the long-term behavior of the model. For both considered values of b
one can identify a threshold value of ω2, denoted by ω
FB1
2 , at which the transition from
residential segregation to possible long run location patterns of integration can occur. This
transition reflects a fold bifurcation at which two new equilibria appear, the one stable
and the other unstable. Notably, the critical point for b = 1.5 occurs already at a lower
level of ω2 compared to b = 2 suggesting that a larger relative preference for integration
of type 2 households enhances the force towards ethnic segregation. Nevertheless, in both
cases, a further narrowing of ethnic income disparities leads to lower levels of integration
such that, at a second threshold level of ω2, denoted by ω
TB
2 , a transition from possible
patterns of integration back to full segregation can be observed. This transition reflects a
transcritical bifurcation at which the unique locally asymptotically stable steady state of
integration crosses the unique unstable equilibrium of segregation xS0 and they exchange
their stability. Thus, for sufficiently small ethnic income gaps, ethnic segregation rather
than economic segregation is the dominating force leading to a situation in which initially
integrated neighborhoods will be only populated by households of type 2 in the long run.
Summarizing, the counteracting forces of ethnic and economic segregation are balanced and
give rise to ethnic integration for values of ω2 that lie between the two critical points ω
FB1
2
and ωTB2 . It should, however, be noted that segregation remains a stable long-run location
pattern that originates when initially the ethnic group 2 is a sufficiently small minority in
the mixed neighborhood.
We now turn to the case in which both households care more about integration, i.e. we
consider η = 1.0 (lower panels of Figure 1). When households put more emphasis on the
individual preferences for integration, the long-term residential patterns are qualitatively
different even though the negative effect of a narrowing income gap on the level of inte-
gration, which could be observed for ω2 ∈
(
ωFB12 , ω
TB
2
)
in case of η = 0.25, persists and
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 1: One-dimension bifurcation diagrams with respect to parameter ω2 (income of a member of
population 2). For each value of ω2 in dark-green is depicted the basin of attraction of the equilibrium
of segregation xS1 , in cyan the basin of attraction of the internal equilibrium x
I
l , i.e. the equilibrium of
integration, and in dark-yellow the basin of attraction of the second equilibrium of segregation, i.e. xS0 . The
red curve represents the unstable equilibrium of integration, denoted by xIu, while in the blue curve represents
the stable internal equilibrium of integration, say xIl . The arrows indicate the direction of trajectories.
Parameters: d = 0.05, ω1 = 1, β = 1. Panel (a), b = 3/2, η = 0.25. Panel (b), b = 2, η = 0.25. Panel (c),
b = 3/2, η = 1. Panel (d), b = 2, η = 1.
can now even be seen over the full support of ω2. In fact, we observe that high levels of
income inequalities do not necessarily imply segregation since the more weight put on the
individual preferences for integration makes the ethnically mixed neighborhood, despite the
large income disparities, more attractive for ethnic group 2. With respect to the different
values of b, again, the global dynamics are qualitatively robust where a higher b seems to
strengthen the effect of ethnic segregation.
It should be noted that the dynamics of the model discussed so far is only valid for
specific parameter settings. To address the complete behavior of the model given any possible
parameter configuration we relay on analytical results. In particular, in order to classify all
the possible qualitative dynamics of the Model (12) under Assumption 1, we start with the
following Lemma (see Proof in Appendix) which describes the main fundamental features
of Model (12).
Lemma 2 Consider the values of the parameters as in Assumption 1 with the exception
that η > 0, b > 1 and ω1 > ω2. Furthermore, let B(·) denote the basin of attraction of an
equilibrium, let ∆Π (x) be as in Equation (13) and define:
ωTB2 =
ω21(√
ω1 + ηd
√
2
)2 . (14)
Then, Model (12) has the following properties:
1. Equilibrium xS0 is locally asymptotically stable ∀ω2 ∈
(
ωTB2 , ω1
)
and unstable ∀ω2 ∈(
0, ωTB2
)
;
2. Equilibrium xS1 is locally asymptotically stable;
3. There are at most two equilibria in (0, 1), which are xIl ∈ (0, 0.5] and xIu ≥ xIl ;
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4. ∀ω2 ∈
(
ωTB2 , ω1
)
xIu is the unique equilibrium in (0, 1) and equilibria x
S
0 and x
S
1 are
both locally asymptotically stable with B (xS0 ) = [0, xIu) and B (xS1 ) = (xIu, 1];
5. ∀ω2 ∈
(
0, ωTB2
)
xS1 is the unique asymptotically stable equilibrium with B
(
xS1
)
= (0, 1]
otherwise xIl and x
I
u exist and x
I
u is unstable.
Here, it is worth noting that, independently of the ethnic income gap, a previously
integrated neighborhood can flip into a segregated one exclusively populated by households
of the more aﬄuent group 1. This occurs if the population of type 1 in the neighborhood
is already sufficiently large. On the contrary, a previously integrated neighborhood can flip
into a segregated one populated by households of the less aﬄuent group 2, but only if the
ethnic income gap is sufficiently narrow. Moreover, there is at most one stable steady state
of residential integration and in this one households of type 2 are never the minority. In
any case, some ethnic income inequality has to be tolerated in order to obtain residential
integration between ethnic groups.
Using the main properties of Map (12) enumerated in Lemma 2, it is possible to prove
(see proof in Appendix) the following Theorem. It describes all the possible configurations
of the dynamics of the model that emerge when varying the ethnic income gap.
Theorem 3 Consider the values of the parameters as in Assumption 1 with the exception
that η > 0, b > 1 and ω1 > ω2. Furthermore, define the bifurcation values ω
FB1
2 ∈ (0, ω1)
and ωFB22 ∈
(
0, ωFB12
)
at which a fold bifurcation occurs through which the internal equilibria
xIl and x
I
u either appear or disappear. Then, for b ≥ 1/ (1− d), one of the following three
scenarios occurs:
• Scenario 1: only ωFB12 exists and for ω2 ∈
(
0, ωFB12
)
, there are no internal equilibria
and we have B (xS1 ) = (0, 1]. For ω2 ∈ (ωFB12 , ωTB2 ), there are two internal equilibria,
say xIu which is unstable and x
I
l which is either locally asymptotically stable or unstable.
Moreover, the equilibrium of segregation xS0 is unstable and x
S
1 is locally asymptotically
stable. For ω2 ∈
(
ωTB2 , ω1
)
, a unique internal equilibrium exists, say xIu, and equilibria
xS1 and x
S
0 are both locally asymptotically stable with B
(
xS0
)
=
[
0, xIu
)
and B (xS1 ) =(
xIu, 1
]
.
• Scenario 2: ωFB12 and ωFB22 do not exist and, for ω2 ∈
(
0, ωTB2
)
there are two
internal equilibria, say xIu which is unstable and x
I
l which is either locally asymp-
totically stable or unstable, equilibrium xS0 is unstable and equilibrium x
S
1 is locally
asymptotically stable. For ω2 ∈
(
ωTB2 , ω1
)
, a unique internal equilibrium exists, and
equilibria xS1 and x
S
0 are both locally asymptotically stable with B
(
xS0
)
=
[
0, xIu
)
and
B (xS1 ) = (xIu, 1].
• Scenario 3: ωFB22 and ωFB12 exist and for ω2 ∈
(
0, ωFB22
)
, there are two internal equi-
libria, say xIu which is unstable and x
I
l which is either locally asymptotically stable or
unstable. The equilibrium of segregation xS0 is unstable and x
S
1 is locally asymptotically
stable. For ω2 ∈
(
ωFB22 , ω
FB1
2
)
, there are no internal equilibria and B (xS1 ) = (0, 1].
For ω2 ∈
(
ωFB12 , ω
TB
2
)
, there are two internal equilibria, say xIu which is unstable and
xIl which is either locally asymptotically stable or unstable, x
S
0 is unstable and x
S
1 is
locally asymptotically stable. Finally, for ω2 ∈
(
ωTB2 , ω1
)
a unique internal equilib-
rium exists, say xIu, and equilibria x
S
0 and x
S
1 are both locally asymptotically stable
with B (xS0 ) = [0, xIu) and B (xS1 ) = (xIu, 1].
For b < 1/ (1− d) either one of the three dynamic scenarios above occurs or, alternatively,
if xIl exists and is locally asymptotically stable, then ω2 ∈
(
0, ωFB12
)
.
Scenarios 1 and 2 are those already discussed in the numerical analysis above. In Sce-
nario 1, which is illustrated in the upper panels of Figure 1, ethnic integration is not possible
for both high and low ethnic income gaps. In Scenario 2, which is illustrated in the lower
panels of the same figure, integration is not feasible only for low levels of income gaps.
Scenario 3 represents an intermediate dynamic configuration between Scenarios 1 and 2; it
features two windows of ethnic income gaps at which segregation is the only outcome that
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the model predicts. This scenario is depicted in Panel (a) of Figure 2. In general, Scenario 1
can be observed for relatively low values of η. If increasing the value of η while keeping the
other parameters constant, the configuration of the dynamics changes first to Scenario 3,
and with a further increase of η the structure of the dynamics eventually switches to that
described by Scenario 2. Scenario 3 is, however, a particular case that can only be observed
for narrow ranges of η.
The condition b > 1/ (1− d) specified in the theorem is sufficient to have one of these
three scenarios and when this condition is not satisfied then additional scenarios may occur
where either integration is not possible or only possible for extreme ethnic income strat-
ifications. An example of these additional scenarios, namely one in which no integration
emerges whatsoever, is depicted in Figure 2 (b). Intuitively, this condition implies that a
large bias d towards members of the own group must be compensated by a higher relative
propensity b towards integration of households of type 2 in order to facilitate integration for
intermediate levels of ethnic income gaps.
So far we focused our analysis on the long-term composition of a possible integrated
neighborhood, which indicates whether a certain level of diversity of a neighborhood is stable
over time. This, however, does not necessarily ensure that in the long run the population
that lives in an integrated neighborhood will not decrease as time elapses. In fact, according
to Equation (1), the number of households that locate in an integrated neighborhood does
not decrease over time if and only if Πi (x) ≥ δi, for each i ∈ {1, 2}. Accordingly, we
introduce the concept of sustainability of a steady state with the following definition.
Definition 1 A sustainable steady state is a fixed point x+ of Model (12) such that Πi (x
+) ≥
δi, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}.
Then, the following Lemma (see proof in Appendix) specifies two sufficient conditions
under which any asymptotically stable steady state of integration is sustainable.
Lemma 3 Each asymptotically stable fixed point x+ ∈ (0, 1) such that either x+ > d/2 or
d <
(√
2− 1)ω1 −√ω1ω2
η
√
2 (ω1 + ω2)
(15)
is a sustainable steady state.
This lemma implies that as long as the bias is relatively small the unique asymptotically
fixed point of integration of Model (12) is always sustainable according to Definition 1.
It is worth pointing out that the bias d is important to determine whether residential
segregation is persistent and sustainable in the long run. In particular, if d tends to be
not too large then the condition b > 1/ (1− d) is satisfied for any b which is not too close
to 1. On the other hand, if d is sufficiently small then steady states of integration tend
to be sustainable. Let us further point out that all steady states of integration considered
in our investigations are sustainable and a numerical test underlines that a steady state of
integration is unsustainable only in the extreme case in which the ethnic income gap is very
large (ω2 is close to 0), the relative importance of integration between group 1 and group 2,
say b, is close to 1, and the bias d tends to 1.
Summarizing, the global dynamics of the model reveals a trade-off between narrowing
ethnic income gap and residential integration stemming from the counteracting forces of
economic and ethnic segregation. Integration can only be achieved if the two forces are
well balanced and this balance is only obtainable for specific, and sometimes rather narrow,
intervals of ethnic income gaps. At the same time, the balance may be fragile as small
changes in the ethnic income gap may cause sudden switches between segregation and inte-
gration. This is due to the fact that the impact of the ethnic income gap on segregation as
its economic drivers is twofold. Once the income gap increases, there is an increasing level
of integration but, at the same time, there is a weakening stability of the steady state of
integration.1 In particular, a 50-50 integrated neighborhood is extremely fragile and it will
not resist to a small increase of the number of households of the more aﬄuent ethnic group.
1Here we conceive the stability of a fixed point as the minimum Euclidean distance between this fixed
point and the border of its basin of attraction.
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(a) (b)
Figure 2: One-dimension bifurcation diagrams with respect to parameter ω2 (income of a member of
population 2) that show in Panel (a) an example of Scenario 3 and in Panel (b) a scenario in which there
is not any long-run stable pattern of integration. For each value of ω2 in dark-green is depicted the basin
of attraction of the equilibrium of segregation xS1 , in cyan the basin of attraction of the internal equilibrium
xIl , i.e. the equilibrium of integration, and in dark-yellow the basin of attraction of the second equilibrium of
segregation, i.e. xS0 . The red curve represents the unstable equilibrium of integration, denoted by x
I
u, while
in the blue curve represents the stable internal equilibrium of integration, say xIl . Panel (a), parameters:
β = 1, b = 2, d = 0.00, ω1 = 1 and η = 0.375. Panel (b), parameters: β = 1, b = 1.1, d = 0.2, ω1 = 1 and
η = 1.5.
In order to put these findings into perspective, let us relate them to the results of Sethi
and Somanathan (2004). In their paper the authors find that, if there is a significant
minority population in a city, segregation will be stable as long as ethnic income disparities
are either sufficiently large or sufficiently small. This finding is consistent with the results
we obtain from the analysis of our model for the case of Scenario 1. Indeed, we can identify
two critical income thresholds (ωFB12 and ω
TB
2 ) between which integration is potentially
stable in the long run. However, the result cannot be observed in Scenarios 2 and 3. In
fact, in Scenario 2 and in Scenario 3, which are associated with a higher η, we observe that
integration can occur also for extreme ethnic income disparities. Altogether, the current
investigation expands the findings of Sethi and Somanathan (2004) in several directions:
first, the observation that integration only occurs for intermediate levels of ethnic income
inequalities is limited to those cases in which the weight η that households put on their
preference for integrated neighborhoods is not too strong. Second, the premise that the
low-income group must be the minority of the population can be relaxed as, given the
parameter choice of η, integration only for intermediate levels of ethnic inequality can be
obtained without any restriction on the population. And, finally, the emergence of ethnic
and economic drivers of segregation allows us to determine the net flows into the mixed
neighborhoods of the ethnic sub populations. As a result, we can specify two different types
of steady states of segregation characterized by the exclusive presence of either households
of type 1 or those of type 2 in the previously integrated neighborhood.
3.3 The Impact of Government Housing Subsidies on Residential
Segregation
The so far conducted investigation reveals that the ethnic income gap has a substantial
impact on the long-term residential outcome and changes in the income gap can alter these
outcomes dramatically. From a policy perspective, this raises another relevant question,
namely whether social programs to support low-income households can have similar impacts
on ethnic diversity in metropolitan districts. In fact, over the last decades, there have
been many examples of public housing subsidy programs and a considerable number of
these measures has been focused on low-income households (see, e.g., Anderson et al., 2003;
McCarty et al., 2014). Those measures have been implemented in several forms. In the U.S.,
for example, the most common practice has been the supply-side housing assistance programs
which subsidize the construction and operation of housing for low-income households. Given
the correlation between income and ethnicity, this implies the threat of subsidizing the
emergence of segregated neighborhoods by construction. The second form of housing subsidy
has been rental assistance programs which aim at subsidizing rents for low-income households
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in the private rental market. Besides tenant-based rental assistance programs that hand
out vouchers directly to low-income households, there are the so-called project-based rental
assistance programs defining neighborhoods in which houses are rented to the more aﬄuent
households at the market price and to low-income families at subsidized prices.
In the following we focus on project-based rental assistance programs and we want to
analyze the possible effects of this policy measure on residential integration. In order to
do so, we assume that the government housing subsidies are reserved for low-income people
that live in an initially integrated neighborhood. In terms of our model, this implies that
the budget equation of members of the less aﬄuent group 2 becomes:
pzz2 + ps (1− φ) s2 = ω2 (16)
with φ representing a subsidy rate, whereas the rest of the model setup remains unchanged.2
What is the effect of introducing such a subsidy scheme? First of all, a subsidy φ has
a positive effect on the housing demand of the low-income households. Quantitatively, the
subsidized demand is thereby consistent with a quantity demanded by a non-subsidized
household with a reference income ω¯ > ω2. The reference income ω¯ and the subsidy rate φ
are thereby linked as follows:
ω¯ =
ω2
1− φ or, equivalently, φ =
ω¯ − ω2
ω¯
. (17)
Since there is a fixed housing supply normalized to 1, the subsidy shifts the relative
housing demand in an integrated neighborhood from aﬄuent tenants to low-income house-
holds. This reallocation of housing demand emerges through the price channel as the higher
demand of the subsidized low-income households drives up the market price of houses in
integrated neighborhoods which, in turn, lowers the demand of high-income households.
However, a too high subsidization can lead to a situation in which the beneficiaries of the
housing subsidies are better off in terms of housing units compared to non-subsidized ten-
ants, which might bear the risk of social conflicts. In order to avoid such a situation, the
subsidy rate has to satisfy the following condition:
Definition 2 (Fairness condition) ω1 > ω¯ or, equivalently, φ ∈
[
0, ω1−ω2ω1
]
.
At the same time, the changing price driven by the subsidized demand of low-income
households in integrated neighborhoods has a negative impact on the utility of the wealthy
households such that these neighborhoods become, in relative terms, less attractive compared
to their outside option. As a result, the introduction of housing subsidies might eventually
increase the risk of segregation.
Based on a numerical analysis, we illustrate in Figure 3 the implications of the subsidy
policy where we restrict our attention to those parameter constellations already considered
in Figure 1, which are consistent with Scenario 1 and 2 of Theorem 3. Here, we show
for a fixed income gap ω2 = 0.5 the effect of variations of the reference income ω¯ on the
residential outcome in the long run. As mentioned above, such a variation is equivalent
to an increase of the subsidy rate φ. In Panel (a), which depicts the long-term residential
patterns for η = 0.25 and b = 1.5, one can see that in case of no subsidies (i.e. ω¯ = 0.5)
the long-term outcome is characterized by full segregation with only households of type 1.
Increasing the subsidy, or equivalently, increasing ω¯, we observe that the residential steady
state can switch from full segregation to integration, where the transition is characterized
by a classical fold bifurcation. A further increase of the subsidy, however, decreases the
achievable levels of integration and, if the subsidy rate is too high, the steady state can even
fall back to full segregation marking a transcritical bifurcation. In this case, the previously
integrated neighborhoods are exclusively populated by households of type 2.
In the other cases illustrated in Figure 3 (b) to (d), which depict the other possible
combinations of b and η considered in Figure 1, the long-term residential patterns at ω2 =
2It should be noted that the subsidy is linked to the income and not to the ethnicity of a household. Since
we assume homogeneous incomes within each group and ω1 > ω2, only households of type 2 are eligible to
receive these subsidies. In Section 4 we will relax the assumption of within-group homogeneity of incomes.
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(c) (d)
Figure 3: One-dimension bifurcation diagrams with respect to parameter ω¯ representing the reference
income for the subsidies. For each value of ω¯ in dark-green is depicted the basin of attraction of the
equilibrium of segregation xS1 , in cyan the basin of attraction of the internal equilibrium x
I
1, i.e. the
equilibrium of integration and in dark-yellow the basin of attraction of the second equilibrium of segregation,
i.e. xS0 . Parameters: d = 0.05, ω1 = 1, β = 1.
0.5 without subsidies are characterized by the possibility of integration. An increase of
the reference income determining the subsidy rate leads in these cases to lower levels of
integration and eventually to the emergence of full segregation, again only with households
of type 2. Altogether, the described outcomes of the numerical analysis suggest that the
long-term effects of subsidizing type-2 households with an income ω2 = 0.5 are qualitatively
identical to those we can observe for narrowing the ethnic income gap starting at ω2 = 0.5.
As a conclusion, this policy illustration points out that applying housing subsidy schemes
can have substantial effects on ethnic diversity in the residential patterns which are quali-
tatively very similar to the effects one obtains when reducing the ethnic income disparities.
However, housing subsidies only affect the housing demand while narrowing the income gap
has also an impact on the demand for consumption goods. Moreover, the results show that
there can be a trade-off between integration and the standard of living of low-income people
in the sense that a policy measure that aims at improving the housing situation of low-
income households may eventually lead to lower levels of integration. If, on the other hand,
due to a large ethnic income gap, the residential distribution is characterized by segregation
in the first place, then the government housing subsidy can favor integration. Moreover,
under certain conditions, even very small changes in the policy can imply strong effects on
the long-term residential outcomes, especially if the system rests in a steady state close to a
politically desirable level of 50-50 integration. Hence, there is also another trade-off, namely
between high levels of integration and the fragility of the steady state. More precisely, in-
creasing the subsidies reduces the level of integration but, at the same time, it lowers the
fragility of the steady state. In any case, it should be clear that policy makers must be aware
of potential trade-offs and should take them into account when they implement economic
measures such as housing subsidies.
14
4 Robustness Check: The Effect of Within-group In-
equality
4.1 An Agent-based Model of Residential Segregation
In the analysis of residential outcomes and possible implications of housing subsidies con-
sidered so far we made a rather restrictive assumption, namely that there is only income
inequality across but not within ethnic groups. This assumption was essentially imposed to
analyze the residential dynamics as an analytically tractable population-based evolutionary
process in which the evolution of xt can be described by the one-dimensional Map (12).
But what happens if this assumption is relaxed? Stay our findings intact when introducing
heterogeneity with respect to income among households of the same type?
Answering these questions is not straightforward. The reason is that it is hardly feasible
to tackle within-group heterogeneity in the simple evolutionary game framework described in
Section 2. In order to address the question of the robustness nonetheless, we now formulate a
variant of the model in which we relax some key assumptions that made it possible to describe
the model by a one-dimensional map in the first place without, however, changing the basic
structure of the model. In particular, we relax the notation of an inherent equilibrium
allocation of a continuum of households across an undefined number of locations. Instead,
we analyze the residential dynamics in a unique neighborhood in which the local population
is modeled as a discrete set of households. The individual income ωj > 0 of a household
j of a type i is thereby drawn from a type-specific distribution represented by log-normal
distributions with ωj ∼ L(ω˜i, σ2ω). Here, ω˜i is a type-specific distribution mean, with
ω˜1 ≥ ω˜2, and σ2ω > 0 is an exogenous model parameter governing the degree of within-group
inequality.
Households are explicitly modeled as autonomous decision making entities implying a
shift from a population-based evolutionary game to an agent-based setup in which the dy-
namic behavior of the model is the aggregate outcome of individual decisions of heteroge-
neous and interacting agents in an adaptive and evolutionary environment. Consistently
with the original model, the residential choice of an individual household is driven by a
comparison of expected payoffs associated with the choice of living either in the integrated
neighborhood or in an outside option characterized by full segregation. The fitness measure
Π˜j,t of household j is thereby influenced by the economic utility from consumption and
housing as well as the appreciation of ethnic diversity in the neighborhood.
Again, information that is relevant for reconsidering the residential choice is transmitted
between households by word of mouth and flows only in a constellation in which a household
located in the integrated neighborhood (labeled neighborhood 1) meets another one living
in his/her outside option (labeled neighborhood 2 for household of type 1 and neighborhood
3 for households of type 2). We assume that a household of the integrated neighborhood
meets one co-ethnic resident from the outside option per period whose income is drawn from
the log-normal distribution L(ω˜i, σ2ω).
Denote by Ht the set of households living in neighborhood 1 at time t, and suppose (j, k)
with j ∈ Ht and k /∈ Ht is a pair of households of the same kind that has been matched
successfully in period t. Then, there is a bilateral flow of information and both parties
reconsider their location choice by taking the obtained information into account to assess
the expected fitness of living either in the neighborhood or in the outside option. The actual
residential decision is modeled as a logit discrete choice problem where for household j the
probability to move from neighborhood 1 to his/her outside option is
P(j moves out) = 1− 1
1 + exp(β(δj,t − Π˜j,t)
, (18)
whereas for household k, the probability to move into the neighborhood is
P(k moves in) =
1
1 + exp(β(δk,t − Π˜k,t))
. (19)
The number of households of type i in the integrated neighborhood at the beginning of the
next period Ni,t+1 is then the sum of all households of that type opting for neighborhood 1.
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Consequently, the level of integration in period t+ 1, which is our variable of interest, is
Xt+1 =
N1,t+1
N1,t+1 +N2,t+1
. (20)
The demand side of the local housing market is composed of the set of households Ht that
decided to live in the neighborhood. The individual demand for housing units s is thereby
driven by the market price ps,t and the individual income ωj . The demand sj as well as the
demand for outside consumption zj is derived from solving the same utility maximization
problem under budget constraint as described in Section 2. Given the local housing price
ps,t and the normalized price for the consumption good pz = 1.0 and assuming α = 0.5, the
corresponding Walrasian demand functions are
sj(ps,t) =
ωj
2 · ps,t and zj =
ωj
2
. (21)
The stock of houses in the neighborhood is assumed to be heterogeneous with respect
to housing standard. However, to keep the analysis simple, the heterogeneous stock is
represented by an aggregate stock with average standard q˜. The housing market yields a
market clearing price ps,t that equals the average demand for housing units with the average
housing standard in the neighborhood. Put formally, we have
1
nt
∑
j∈Ht
sj(ps,t, ωj) = q˜, (22)
where nt = |Ht| represents the population size of neighborhood 1. Normalizing q˜ = 1, the
market clearing price is then
ps,t =
1
2nt
∑
j∈Ht
ωj , (23)
which is consistent with the price one obtains in the population-based model described in
Section 2 (compare Equation (7)).
Now we introduce a modification to the model setup that aims at limiting the demo-
graphic dynamics that emerge by relaxing the assumption of a population density equilib-
rium. In fact, since we consider a single neighborhood and at the same time it cannot be
ruled out that δj,t < Π˜j,t holds for a large majority of households, there is the possibility of a
high population growth that might lead to an overpopulated neighborhood. However, as we
are only interested in the long-term dynamics of the ethnic composition in the neighborhood,
we introduce an additional component to the payoff function that reduces the payoff of liv-
ing in an overpopulated neighborhood and therefore mitigates the demographic dynamics.3
More precisely, the negative demographic effect is captured by a penalizing term g in the
payoff function that depends on a measure of the population density ρt =
nt
m , where m can
be interpreted as the area of the neighborhood. Function g has the properties
g(ρt) = ρ
ψ
t with ψ > 0. (24)
Below we will show that this demographic component in the payoff function does not affect
the residential dynamics with respect to the ethnic composition.
Altogether, the expected payoff of household j of type i that is associated with living in
the neighborhood populated by the set of households Ht is given by
Π˜j = V˜j(Ht) + ηfi (Xt)− g(ρt), (25)
where fi captures the type-specific preferences for ethnic diversity and is identical with
Equation (10) in Section 2. V˜j denotes the indirect utility function of household j that
depends on the average income of the neighborhood’s population Ht, i.e.,
V˜j(Ht) =
√
nt
2
∑
k∈Ht ωk
· ωj . (26)
3In fact, a negative relationship between payoff and population density is consistent with empirical
evidences as studies show that low-density settlement is the preferred choice for residential living, see, e.g.,
Gordon and Richardson (1997).
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The outside option represents the rest of the world in which a household can always
choose to live in full segregation. The in- and outflow into neighborhood 1 does not affect
the demographics in the outside option, therefore the population density and consequently
g is constant. Without loss of generality, we set g = 0 in the two outside options. The payoff
of the outside option is then
δj,t =

√
1
2ω˜1
· ωj + f1(1) if j is of type i = 1,√
1
2ω˜2
· ωj + f2(0) else.
(27)
The evolution of Xt can be described as a stochastic evolutionary process that is driven
by the co-evolution of the number of households of the two types living in the neighbor-
hood. The following proposition demonstrates that, despite the differences in the setup, the
stochastic framework has the same dynamic core as the deterministic model of Section 2
such that, as long as the stochastic model is set up without within-group inequality (i.e.
σ2ω = 0), both models generate the same long-term residential dynamics. This allows to use
the stochastic model to assess the robustness of the residential dynamics with respect to the
introduction of within-group inequality in the first place (proof see appendix).
Proposition 1 Suppose σ2ω = 0. If the population size nt in the neighborhood is suffi-
ciently large, then the long-term behavior of the deterministic population-based dynamics of
Map (12) can be approximated by the stochastic agent-based process of Xt.
To illustrate this issue we now show simulation results of the agent-based model with a
setup with σω = 0. In particular, we show the long-term dynamics for two values η = 0.25
and η = 1.0 in order to capture the two scenarios 1 and 2 defined in Theorem 3. The
remaining parameter values are chosen as summarized in Table 1.
In the following discussion, the simulation results are presented in an analog way as
we discussed the numerical results of the evolutionary game. To this end, we carried out
different sets of simulations for which we varied the initial ethnic mix X0 together with the
average income of the low-income ethnic group ω˜2. In order to capture the stochastic nature
of the emerging agent-based dynamics, we carried out 20 batch runs for each considered
pair (X0, ω˜2).
4 The simulation output is then used to construct one-dimensional bifurcation
diagrams for the long-term values of X ∈ [0, 1] indicating the degree of integration in the
neighborhood. These diagrams illustrate the stochastic equilibria of the simulations as
well as their basins of attraction in the considered one-dimensional parameter sub space.
Concerning the stochastic equilibria, we will refer to X0 and X1 as the stochastic analogous
of the equilibria of segregation xS0 and x
S
1 of the evolutionary model in the previous section,
and to XI as the stochastic analogous of the equilibrium of integration xIl .
5
Note that we use here a stochastic concept of basins of attraction. Serdukova et al.
(2016), for example, describe stochastic basins of attraction as the set of initial conditions
whose solutions have a small probability to escape the neighborhood of an attractor and
have a high probability to return to the vicinity of the same attractor. This concept is
used in the context of metastability, which describes the property of a system when long
periods of stasis are punctuated by sudden changes of the regime (see, e.g., Young, 2006).
In general, these tipping phenomena can occur if the random noise of the stochastic process
accumulates such that its trajectory escapes the basin of attraction (in a deterministic sense)
of the current equilibrium and enters the basin of another one. In the present stochastic
framework, metastability is related to the aspects of fragility discussed in Section 3. In
order to address the issue of fragility in the context of the stochastic process, we mark any
initial condition (X0, ω˜2) as fragile if there is at least one of the 20 batch runs ending up in
a different equilibrium than the others. Any initial condition that is not marked as fragile,
in contrast, represents a stochastic basin of attraction of a stochastic equilibrium.
4We consider discrete sets with X0 ∈ {0.0, 0.025, 0.05, ..., 0.975, 1.0} and ω˜2 ∈ {0.01, 0.02, ..., 0.99, 1.0}.
5In the following, we will define the stochastic equilibria of segregation by X1 = {X|X > 0.99} and
X0 = {X|X < 0.01}, where X is the average Xt the time interval 500 ≤ t ≤ 600. The stochastic equilibria
of integration XI are defined accordingly. The curve representing XI in the figures are estimated by applying
Generalized Additive Models with penalized splines (see, e.g., Wood, 2011) based on all observation Xt in
500 ≤ t ≤ 600 from all 20 batch runs that are in the interval [0.01,0.99].
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Parameter Description Value
n0 Initial population size in the neighborhood 10.000
β Intensity of choice 1.0
d Bias towards members of the own type 0.05
b Parameter ethnic tolerance type 2 1.5
m Area of the neighborhood 20.000
ψ Effect of population density 4.0
ω˜1 Average income group 1 1.0
Table 1: Parameters of the agent-based model.
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Figure 4: One-dimension bifurcation diagrams of the agent-based model with σω = 0.0 for η = 0.25
(panel a) and η = 1.0 (panel b). For each value of ω˜2 in dark-green is depicted the basin of attraction
of the stochastic equilibrium of segregation X1, in cyan the basin of attraction of the stochastic internal
equilibrium XI , i.e. the equilibrium of integration and in dark-yellow the basin of attraction of the second
equilibrium of segregation, i.e. X0. The dark-red region marks the regions from which the system either
converges to XI or X1.
Let us now consider how the simulation model and the evolutionary game behave in
direct comparison. Figure 4 shows the global dynamics of the agent-based model with
respect to a variation of parameter ω˜2 ∈ [0.01, 1.0] for the two values of η = 0.25 (left) and
η = 1.0 (right). As suggested by Proposition 1, comparing Figure 4 with Figure 1 reveals
that the global dynamics generated by the simulation model are indeed very similar to those
of the evolutionary game. Moreover, there are only small areas at the border of the basins
of attraction of XI and X1 in which the system shows signs of fragility.
4.2 The Robustness of the Evolutionary Dynamics
The previous discussion illustrates that the simulation output of the agent-based model
with no inequality within ethnic groups is very close to the numerical benchmark of the
deterministic evolutionary dynamics. But how does the behavior change if we introduce
within-group heterogeneity? The upper panels of Figure 5 illustrate for η = 0.25 and
1.0 the global dynamics of the simulation model using the same setup as above but with
σω = 0.5 instead of σω = 0.0. Thus, we introduce a substantial income inequality into
both sub populations. By comparing these panels with the benchmark without intra-group
heterogeneity in Figure 4, one can clearly see that the global dynamics are qualitatively very
similar to those of the simulations without inequality. Therefore, one can conclude that the
findings with respect to the interaction of ethnic and economic segregation are robust if
extending the analysis by incorporating within-group inequality. The lower panels show for
fixed levels of ω˜2 the effect of a change in the level of within-group inequality. These graphics
confirm the assertion that for a wide range of within-group inequality there are hardly any
effects on the long-term level of residential integration.
Now we turn to the robustness of the results of the policy analysis. In Section 3.3, we
considered the long-term residential pattern of the evolutionary game under a governmental
18
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
ω~2
x
0.2 0.6 0.6 0.8 1
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
ω~2
x
0.2 0.6 0.6 0.8 1
(a) (b)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
σω
x
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
σω
x
(c) (d)
Figure 5: One-dimension bifurcation diagrams of the agent-based model for η = 0.25 (left panels) and
η = 1.0 (right panels) with σω = 0.5 and ω˜2 as bifurcation parameter (upper panels) and ω˜2 = 0.8 (panel c)
or, respectively, ω˜2 = 0.6 and σω as bifurcation parameter (lower panels). In dark-green is depicted the basin
of attraction of the stochastic equilibrium of segregation X1, in cyan the basin of attraction of the stochastic
internal equilibrium XI , i.e. the equilibrium of integration and in dark-yellow the basin of attraction of the
second equilibrium of segregation, i.e. X0. The dark-red region marks the regions from which the system
either converges to XI or X1.
subsidy regime that is supposed to lower housing prices for low-income households in order
to guarantee a minimum housing standard. However, since we considered the absence of
within-group heterogeneity, the beneficiaries of the policy always belonged to the group
i = 2.
When introducing within-group inequality, the income distributions might overlap such
that the least aﬄuent households of group 1 earn less than the most aﬄuent households
of the other group. In such a case, the beneficiaries of the subsidy must not necessarily
belong to group 2. In the following, we assume that again low-income households receive a
subsidy that allows them to live in a house that corresponds to a minimum standard that
is consistent with the demand of a unsubsidized household with a threshold income ω¯. But
before we discuss the policy design in more detail, we have to adjust the fairness condition
introduced in Section 3.3, which makes sure that beneficiaries of the housing subsidies are
not better off with respect to housing units compared to non subsidized tenants:
Definition 3 (Fairness condition II) Suppose household k and l live in the target neigh-
borhood 1, i.e. k, l ∈ Ht and suppose that ωk > ωl. Then, we need to have the following
condition:
ωk
2p1,t (1− φk) ≥
ωl
2p1,t (1− φl) . (28)
In the following, we assume that household j, if his/her income ωj is below the threshold
income ω¯, receives a subsidy on the housing price that depends on the individual gap between
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Figure 6: One-dimension bifurcation diagrams of the agent-based model with σω = 0.0 and η = 0.25
(panel a), σω = 0.5 and η = 0.25 (panel b), σω = 0.0 and η = 1.0 (panel c) and σω = 0.5 and η = 1.0
(panel d). For each value of ω¯ in dark-green is depicted the basin of attraction of the stochastic equilibrium of
segregation X1, in cyan the basin of attraction of the stochastic internal equilibrium XI , i.e. the equilibrium
of integration and in dark-yellow the basin of attraction of the second equilibrium of segregation, i.e. X0.
The dark-red region marks the regions from which the system either converges to XI or X1.
the own income and the threshold. Put formally, we have
φj = max
(
0,
ω¯ − ωj
ω¯
)
, (29)
where it is easy to see that (29) satisfies the fairness condition.
In Figure 6, we again depict diagrams for η = 0.25 (upper panels) and η = 1.0 (lower
panels) for the cases σω = 0.0 and 0.5. Here, the threshold income ω¯ is varied between
0.5 and 1.0, where the lower bound corresponds to ω˜2 and the upper bound to ω˜1. Thus,
we can compare how the presence of within-group heterogeneity affects the implications of
the subsidy policy. Note that again, when comparing the left panels with an homogeneous
within-group income with Figure 3, then it becomes apparent that the dynamics of the
agent-based model are a close approximation of the deterministic evolutionary dynamics.
Apparently, the issue of robustness becomes more ambiguous for the policy scenario.
Qualitatively, the introduction of within-group inequality leads to a similar impact of the
housing subsidy as in the scenario without inequality. In particular, if the individual weight
put on ethnic aspects of the neighborhood choice are minor (η = 0.25), then an increasing
threshold income ω¯ can give rise to a rapid transition from complete segregation with only
households of type 1 to full integration. A further increase of ω¯ weakens the effect of economic
segregation thereby leading to an increasing dominance of type 2 households, which can, if ω¯
is sufficiently large, result in a situation in which the neighborhood is exclusively populated
by households of type 2. For η = 1.0, a weakening of economic segregation in response to
an increasing ω¯ can also be observed but at a substantially weaker level.
Comparing the left and right panels of Figure 6 illustrates, however, that in case of
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within-group income heterogeneity the weakening effect of an increasing minimum hous-
ing standard on the economic drivers of segregation is less pronounced. As a consequence,
especially for higher levels of ω¯, more integration can be achieved when the two sub pop-
ulations have heterogeneous incomes. Moreover, the presence of within-group inequality
increases the fragility of the long-term equilibrium, which can be seen from the enlarged
region representing the punctuated equilibrium behavior at the basins of attraction of XI
close to 0.5.
The reason for these differences can be found in the fact that within-group income
inequality changes the ethnic composition of the potential beneficiaries of the subsidy such
that the higher the heterogeneity the more diverse is the pool of potential recipients of
the policy. More precisely, for a given level of ω¯ with ω˜2 < ω¯ < ω˜1, in the case without
heterogeneity (i.e. σω = 0) the recipients of the subsidy exclusively belong to group 2. A
rising σω, however, might increase the fraction of members of group 1 whose income is below
the threshold income ω¯ and is hence eligible for the subsidy. At the same time, it reduces the
number of potential beneficiaries in group 2. Since the subsidies increase the attractiveness
of neighborhood 1 for recipients of the subsidy, more within-group heterogeneity leads to a
higher share of households of type 1 in that neighborhood.
At the same time, subsidizing low income households in the potentially integrated neigh-
borhood leads to higher housing prices in this neighborhood, which is the result of a higher
housing demand of the beneficiaries of the policy. Due to the convexity of the indirect utility
function with respect to housing prices, the differential in terms of economic utility from
living in neighborhood 1 versus households’ outside options, i.e. neighborhood 2 for type 1
and neighborhood 3 for type 2 households, is on average smaller for households of type 1,
given that the emerging housing prices can be ordered by p3s,t < p
1
s,t < p
2
s,t, where p
k
s,t is the
market price for housing units in neighborhood k. As a result, there is an additional shift in
the relative attractiveness of neighborhood 1 in favor of type 1 households although there is
also a counteracting effect in favor of type-2 households that is caused by a higher X together
with the assumption that type 2 households are the more tolerant households with respect to
ethnically mixed neighborhoods (b > 1). Altogether, by introducing within-group inequal-
ity, the integrated neighborhood 1 becomes more attractive for type 1 households, which
weakens the effect of ethnic segregation and, under specific conditions, allows to achieve
higher levels of integration. Nevertheless, the results show also for the policy analysis a high
level of robustness such that the qualitative conclusions obtained from the analysis of the
evolutionary game still hold.
To sum up, we consider the following conjecture which summarizes the implications of
introducing within-group income inequality.
Conjecture 1 The introduction of within-group inequality does not affect the residential
dynamics as long as there are no housing subsidies for low-income households. Otherwise,
a high level of income inequality within ethnic groups leads to a weakening of the force
towards economic segregation such that aspects of ethnicity play a more prominent role in
determining the long-term residential pattern.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
Residential segregation by income and ethnicity represent a persistent phenomena in many
western societies with a strong impact on social cohesion. At the same time, governments
spend considerable funds for housing policies aimed at supporting low-income households,
and it is not a priori clear how these policies affect the residential patterns. The aim of this
paper was to provide a theoretical framework for explaining the emergence of residential
integration and segregation and to develop a model that can serve as a tool for analyzing the
effects of housing policies on residential outcomes. To this end, we introduced a dynamic
evolutionary model where households select the residential location based on individual
preferences for the ethnic composition of the neighborhoods and endogenous market prices
of housing. Households belong to two different ethnic groups. The first is made of people
that put less emphasis on ethnic diversity but are more aﬄuent than the member of the
second one. The sorting dynamics is described by an evolutionary-like game.
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The model reveals that residential integration is possible only when segregation by eth-
nicity is counterbalanced by stratification by income. Thus, a certain level of ethnic income
disparities is the price the society has to pay for residential integration. In that sense, ethnic
factors and economic factors combined together facilitate integration whereas narrowing eth-
nic income disparities result in increasing residential segregation. Nevertheless, this is not a
generic observation of the model as these results do not hold true for the entire parameter
space. In fact, for low heterogeneities in the individual preferences for diversity between
the two ethnic groups, economic segregation prevails in the long run for whatever level of
ethnic income gap. On the contrary, in case of significant differences in the propensity to-
wards integration, the ethnic income disparities play a crucial role in determining whether
segregation or integration prevails in the long run.
This underlines that a policy measure supposed to strengthen residential integration
must be able to balance the economic and ethnic drivers of segregation. Since it is difficult
to reshape individuals’ preferences at least in the short run, the policy has to target the eco-
nomic forces towards segregation stemming from ethnic income disparities. In this respect,
we analyzed the impact of a housing subsidy scheme that mimics the practice of supporting
low-income households in the rental market. We found that the effect of the government
housing subsidies for low-income households on residential integration is ambiguous. In
particular, if the ethnic income gap is sufficiently large such that economic segregation pre-
vails, then government housing subsidies favor integration. On the other hand, if ethnic
segregation prevails, the introduction of government housing subsidies fosters segregation.
Furthermore, the dynamic framework of our model allows to discuss asymptotic and
structural stability of the patterns of integration. In this respect, our investigation reveals
that the unique asymptotically stable equilibrium of integration is such that the less tolerant
ethnic group is always the minority. Moreover, the higher the level of integration in a
residential location equilibrium, the more fragile is the global stability of this equilibrium.
Emblematic is the equilibrium of perfect integration, where half of the households of a
neighborhood belongs to the wealthy ethnic group and the other half to the other ethnic
group. This particular configuration is only marginally stable representing a tipping point
at which a slight change in the ethnic mix of the neighborhood might trigger residential
patterns of segregation. Moreover, this equilibrium is also structurally unstable, in the
sense that a variation in the parameter space might also drive the system from integration
to full segregation. This especially holds for changes in the ethnic income gap and the
housing subsidy rates revealing possible policy trade-offs between high level of integration
and the stability of the residential equilibrium patterns.
The model used to carry out this analysis is a highly stylized population-based evolution-
ary model. The simplicity of this model allows to have a easy-to-use and easy-to-understand
tool for policy analysis. Although simple models are always preferable with respect to com-
plicated ones, the risk is to have a limited view of the phenomenon and to miss some
important aspects of the problem that may have a fundamental impact in the final output
of the real system. In this respect, stylized models must go through robustness tests to be
deemed trustworthy. In order to provide a robustness analysis for our stylized model, we
developed a related agent-based model where we additionally included income inequality
within ethnic groups. A comparison of the outcomes of the two models provides further
confirmations that residential integration can be achieved through a combination of ethnic
income disparities and individual preferences. Furthermore, the robustness test suggests
that the population-based stylized model without intra-ethnic income inequality performs
sufficiently well as a tool for policy analysis.
What policy implications can be derived from this study? Our policy analysis shows
that a housing policy that subsidizes low-income households can have diametrically opposed
effects on the level of ethnic integration and the direction in which the policy works depends
on the starting condition. If the ethnic income differential is sufficiently large such that the
economic aspects dominate driving the residential outcome towards full segregation, then
a housing subsidy for low-income households can give rise to integration by weakening the
economic drivers of segregation. In this scenario, the housing policy can achieve two goals,
a higher housing standard for low-income households and more integration. If, however,
the ethnic and economic drivers offset each other such that residential integration prevails,
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then the policy’s weakening effect on the economic drivers of segregation reduces the level
of integration. This implies a possible conflict of interest between improving the housing
standard of low-income households and achieving ethnic diversity. On the other hand, in this
scenario, the subsidy policy would increase the stability of the state of integration, which
can be considered as a positive aspect from a policy perspective. Thus, there is another
trade-off which a policy maker has to take into account, namely a trade-off between stability
and high levels of ethnic diversity. Altogether, policy makers should be aware that the
residential implications of housing subsidies supporting low-income households are highly
ambiguous and particularly sensitive to the state of the residential environment at which the
policy is going to be implemented. In that sense, those housing subsidies must be considered
with caution when introduced as a policy to foster residential integration.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Assuming xt ∈ (0, 1), let us note that xt+1 ≷ xt when the de-
nominator of Map (12) is smaller/larger than one. Since the denominator of Map (12) is
smaller/larger than one when ∆Π (xt) ≶ 0, property 1 follows. Let us further note that
∀xt ∈ [0, 1] the denominator of Map (12) is positive and greater or equal than the numera-
tor which is non negative, then xt+1 ∈ [0, 1] and property 2 follows. Finally, imposing the
equilibrium condition for Map (12), properties 3 and 4 follows.
Proof of Theorem 1. By Lemma 1 xS0 and x
S
1 are always equilibria of Model (12).
Moreover, since ω1 = ω2 by assumption, ∆Π (x) defined in (13) is such that ∆Π (x) =
η (d− 2 (1− b+ db)x) > 0 ∀x ∈ (0, 0.5), which implies (see properties 1 and 4 in Lemma
1) xt+1 < xt ∀xt ∈ (0, 0.5) and the absence of equilibria in (0, 0.5). Moreover, ∆Π (x) =
η (2d− 2 + 2b) (1− x)− bd ∀x ∈ (0.5, 1), which implies (see properties 1 and 4 in Lemma 1)
the presence of the following unique equilibrium (it always exists) of Model (12) in (0.5, 1)
x∗ = 1− bd
2 (b− 1 + d) , (30)
xt+1 < xt ∀xt ∈ (0.5, x∗) and xt+1 > xt ∀xt ∈ (x∗, 1). Hence, the statement of the Theorem
follows by straightforward considerations.
Proof of Theorem 2. By Lemma 1 xS0 and x
S
1 are always equilibria of Model (12).
Moreover, η = 0 and ω1 > ω2 by assumption. Then, ∆Π (x) defined in (13) is given by√
ω1
2
(
1−
√
ω1
ω1x+ ω2 (1− x)
)
−
√
ω2
2
(
1−
√
ω2
ω1x+ ω2 (1− x)
)
(31)
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and ∆Π (x) < 0 ∀x ∈ [0, 1], which implies (see property 1 in Lemma 1) xt+1 − xt > 0
∀xt ∈ (0, 1). Hence, the statement of the Theorem follows by straightforward considerations.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let us prove one by one all the five properties of the Lemma:
1. Since
∆Π (0) =
√
ω1
2
+ ηd− ω1√
2ω2
(32)
we have that ∆Π (0) ≷ 0 for ω2 ≷ ωTB2 . By continuity of function ∆Π (x) the same
holds true in a non empty neighborhood of the equilibrium xS0 = 0. Then, property 1
follows from Lemma 1.
2. Since
∆Π (1) =
ω2√
2ω1
−
√
ω2
2
− ηbd < 0 (33)
for all constellations of the values of the parameters in Φ. By continuity of function
∆Π (x) the same holds true in a non empty neighborhood of the equilibrium xS1 = 1.
Then, property 2 follows from Lemma 1.
3. Let us start showing that there are at most two equilibria in (0, 1). To this aim, let
us first prove that at most one equilibrium in (0.5, 1) exist and at most two equilibria
in (0, 0.5] exist. As specified in Lemma 1, x∗ ∈ (0, 1) is an equilibrium of Map (12) if
and only if ∆Π (x∗) = 0. For x < 0.5 we have ∆Π (x) = 0 when
ω2 − ω1√
2 (ω1x+ ω2 (1− x))
+ 2ηb (1− d)x− 2ηx+
√
ω1
2
+ ηd−
√
ω2
2
= 0 (34)
Operating the change of variable
z =
√
ω1x+ ω2 (1− x) ≥ √ω2 (35)
the number of real solutions of Equation (34) corresponds to the number of real and
greater than
√
ω2 (≥ 0) solutions of the following equation
z3 + p1z + q1 = 0 (36)
where
p1 =
(√
ω1
2 + ηd−
√
ω2
2
)
(ω1 − ω2)
2η (b (1− d)− 1) − ω2 and q1 =
− (ω2 − ω1)2
η (b (1− d)− 1)√8 (37)
Since either q1 < 0 (when b (1− d)−1 > 0) or q1 > 0 and p1 < 0 (when b (1− d)−1 <
0), from Cardano-Descartes rule of signs we know that Equation (36) has at most
one real positive solution when b (1− d) − 1 > 0 and at most two positive real roots
otherwise. Then, at most a unique equilibrium of Model (12) exists in (0, 0.5) when
b (1− d)−1 > 0 and at most two otherwise. For x ∈ (0.5, 1) the equilibrium condition
∆Π (x) = 0 is given by
ω2 − ω1√
2 (ω1x+ ω2 (1− x))
−2η (1− d)+2ηb+2η ((1− d)− b)x+
√
ω1
2
−
√
ω2
2
−ηbd = 0
(38)
To prove that there could be at most one equilibrium (real solution of Equation (38))
in (0.5, 1), let us employ the change of variable (35). Then, defining
q2 =
(ω1 + ω2)
2
η (b− 1 + d)√8 ; p2 =
(√
ω1
2 −
√
ω2
2 + η (2 (b− 1) (1− d) + bd)
)
(ω1 − ω2)
2η (1− d− b) −ω2
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and h (z) = z3 + p2z + q2, we obtain
h (z) = 0 (39)
The maximum number of solutions of Equation (39) in the interval
(√
ω1+ω2
2 ,
√
ω1
)
corresponds to the maximum number of solutions of equation ∆Π (x) = 0 in the
interval (0.5, 1). Since q2 > 0 and p2 < 0, by Cardano-Descartes rule of signs Equa-
tion (39) has at most two positive solutions, therefore at most two solutions in the
interval
(√
ω1+ω2
2 ,
√
ω1
)
. Since function h (z) is a third-degree polynomial such that
h (z) → +∞ as z → +∞ which has at most two positive zeros and let z be a pos-
itive real value such that ∂h(z)∂z = 0, two solutions of Equation (39) in the interval(√
ω1+ω2
2 ,
√
ω1
)
imply the following necessary conditions
z =
√
−p2
3 ∈
(√
ω1+ω2
2 ,
√
ω1
)
h
(√
ω1
)
> 0
h
(√
ω1+ω2
2
)
> 0
h (z) < 0
⇔

−3ω1+ω22 > p2 > −3ω1
p2 > − q2√ω1 − ω1
p2 > − q2√ω1+ω2
2
− ω1+ω22
q2 <
√
−4
27 (p2)
3
(40)
Using the first one of these necessary conditions (specifically −p2 < 3ω1), the last
one implies q2 < 2ω1
√
ω1. Then, the third one requires p2 > −3ω1+ω22 , which in
turn contradicts the first one. Hence, there is at most one root of Equation (39) in
the interval
(√
ω1+ω2
2 ,
√
ω1
)
and equation ∆Π (x) = 0 has at most a unique solution
in the interval (0.5, 1). Then, at most a unique equilibrium of Model (12) exists in
(0.5, 1) and its existence implies (∆Π is a continuous function and ∆Π (1) < 0 always)
∆Π (0.5) > 0. Finally, to prove that the inner equilibria are at most two, let us recap
that two equilibria in (0, 0.5] require b (1− d) − 1 < 0, then the function on the left-
hand side of Equation (34) (which is equal to ∆Π (x) ∀x ∈ (0, 0.5]) tends to −∞ as
x tends to +∞ and it does not have roots for x ≥ 0.5. Therefore, the continuity of
the function implies ∆Π (0.5) < 0. As already verified, the latter inequality implies no
equilibria in (0.5, 1). Hence, at most two equilibria exist in (0, 1). Let us denote the
greater of the these two equilibria by xlu and by x
l
l the smaller one. Then, property 3
follows by noting that xll has to belong to the interval (0, 0.5] since two equilibria in
(0.5, 1) cannot exist.
4. Let us consider ω2 ∈
(
ωTB2 , ω1
)
, which implies (first two properties of the current
Lemma) that ∆Π (1) < 0 and ∆Π (0) > 0. Then, by continuity of function ∆Π the
equation ∆Π (x) = 0 has either one or more than two solutions in (0, 1). This implies
that Model (12) has to have either one or more than two equilibria in (0, 1). According
to property 3 of the current Lemma more than two equilibria cannot exist in (0, 1).
Hence, ∀ω2 ∈
(
ωTB2 , ω1
)
a unique equilibrium xIl exists in (0, 1). Moreover, since
∆Π (0) > 0, by continuity of function ∆Π we have that ∆Π (x) > 0 ∀x ∈ (0, xIl )
and ∆Π (x) < 0 ∀x ∈ (xIl , 1). Then, from property 1 in Lemma 1 it follows that
B (xS0 ) = [0, xIl ) and B (xS1 ) = (xIl , 1], which proves property 4.
5. Let us consider ω2 ∈
(
0, ωTB2
)
, which implies (first two properties of the current
Lemma) ∆Π (1) < 0 and ∆Π (0) < 0. Then, by continuity of function ∆Π the equation
∆Π (x) = 0 has either zero solutions or at least two solutions in (0, 1). Therefore,
∆Π (x) < 0 ∀x ∈ (0, 1) if there are not internal equilibria, otherwise by property 3 two
equilibria, xIl and x
I
u, exist in (0, 1) and ∆Π (x) < 0 ∀x ∈
(
xIu, 1
)
. Hence, property 1
in Lemma 1 implies that xIu is unstable. This proves property 5.
Proof of Theorem 3. By properties 3 in Lemma 1 xS0 and x
S
1 are equilibria of Model (12)
which has, by property 3 in Lemma 2, at most two more (internal) equilibria in (0, 1). Then,
only three possible configurations of rest points for Model (12) are possible. The first one
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characterized by two internal equilibria. The second one characterized by a unique inter-
nal equilibrium. The third one characterized by no internal equilibria. By continuity of
Map (12), the transition from one configuration to another occurs through bifurcations at
which equilibria merge. From bifurcation theory, see e.g. Devaney (1989), fold and transcrit-
ical are the only two bifurcations through which equilibria can appear/disappear from an
invariant set of a one-dimensional continuous map as (12). A transcritical bifurcation occurs
at ω2 = ω
TB
2 , since x
S
0 is an equilibrium before and after it, the associated eigenvalue is equal
to one and by properties 4 and 5 of Lemma 2 an equilibrium has either to enter or to exit the
invariant set [0, 1] when ω2 increases and crosses ω
TB
2 . Let us label by ω
TBa
2 the bifurcation
value ωTB2 when a transcritical bifurcation occurs such that an internal equilibrium appears
and exists in [0, 1] for ω2 in a left-side neighborhood of ω
TB
2 and ω
TBb
2 otherwise. Since
equilibrium xS1 is always locally asymptotically stable as stated in Lemma 1, equilibrium x
I
u
is always unstable and xS0 changes stability only at ω
TB
2 , see Lemma 2, by straightforward
considerations there are no further transcritical bifurcations. Concerning fold bifurcations,
they imply a couple of fixed points that collide and annihilate each other and thus the ex-
istence of an x¯ such that x¯ = xIu = x
I
l and ∆Π (x¯) = 0. Since x
I
l ∈ (0, 0.5] as stated in
property 3 of Lemma 2, it follows that x¯ ∈ (0, 0.5]. Let us assume (x1, ωFB12 ) and (x2, ωFB22 )
to be the values of the state variable and of parameter ω2 at which a fold bifurcation occur
and without loss of generality let us assume ωFB12 ≥ ωFB22 . The appearance/disappearance
of two internal fixed points in case of fold bifurcations implies ωFB12 , ω
FB2
2 ∈
(
0, ωTB2
)
, see
properties 4 and 5 in Lemma 2. Since ∆Π (0) < 0 and ∆Π (1) < 0 when ω2 ∈
(
0, ωTB2
)
, as
implicit in property 5 of Lemma 2, the existence of two equilibria for ω2 ∈
(
ωFB22 , ω
FB1
2
)
implies an x˜ ∈ (0, 1) such that ∆Π (x˜) > 0 for some ω2 ∈
(
ωFB22 , ω
FB1
2
)
and ∆Π (x˜) < 0 for
some ω2 ∈
(
0, ωFB22
) ∪ (ωFB12 , ωTB2 ), which is impossible since ∆Π (x˜) is a strictly convex
function w.r.t ω2. Then, two equilibria cannot exist in
(
ωFB22 , ω
FB1
2
)
, therefore neither fold
bifurcations, and (from the strict convexity of ∆Π (x1) and ∆Π (x2) w.r.t ω2) ∆Π (x1) > 0
for all ω2 ∈
(
0, ωFB22
)
and ∆Π (x2) > 0 for all ω2 ∈
(
ωFB22 , ω
TB
2
)
, therefore at least two
internal equilibria exist for ω2 ∈
(
0, ωFB12
) ∪ (ωFB22 , ωTB2 ). Since more than two equilibria
for ω2 ∈
(
0, ωFB22
) ∪ (ωFB12 , ωTB2 ) cannot exist, see property 3 in Lemma 2, further fold
bifurcations cannot occur for ω2 ∈
(
0, ωFB22
) ∪ (ωFB12 , ωTB2 ) either. Hence, varying ω2 in
(0, ω1) at most two fold bifurcations can occur, one at ω
FB2
2 < ω
FB1
2 and the other one at
ωFB12 < ω
TB
2 . Without loss of generality assume that ω
FB2
2 implies ω
FB1
2 . Then, all the
possible sequences of bifurcations are:
1. ωFB22 < ω
FB1
2 < ω
TBa
2 ;
2. ωFB22 < ω
FB1
2 < ω
TBb
2 ;
3. ωFB12 < ω
TBa
2 (ω
FB2
2 does not exist);
4. ωFB12 < ω
TBb
2 (ω
FB2
2 does not exist);
5. ωTBa2 (ω
FB2
2 and ω
FB1
2 do not exist);
6. ωTBb2 (ω
FB2
2 and ω
FB1
2 do not exist);
Let us start noting that, independently of which sequence of bifurcation occurs, the dynamics
of Model (12) for ω2 ∈
(
ωTB2 , ω1
)
(where ωTB2 is either ω
TBa
2 or ω
TBb
2 ) does not change and
it is described by property 4 in Lemma 2. Then, by Lemmas 1 and 2, the first, the third
and the fifth sequences of bifurcations imply scenarios 3, 1 and 2, respectively, and the
numerical simulations in Figure 2, Panel (a) and in Figure 1, Panel (a) and Panel (b),
prove their existence. The second sequence of bifurcations is impossible since it would imply
the existence of two internal equilibria for ω2 ∈
(
ωFB22 , ω
FB1
2
)
which we already proved
to be impossible. As a last step, it remains to discuss the bifurcation sequences 4 and 6.
Concerning these two cases, let us note that condition b (1− d) > 1 implies ∆Π (0.5) > 0
when ∆Π (0) = 0 at ω2 = ω
TBb
2 . Thus, since ∆Π (1) < 0 always and ∆Π is a continuous
function, an equilibrium lays in the subspace (0.5, 1) when ω2 = ω
TBb
2 . Moreover, the
continuity of Map (12) implies that it exists an equilibrium in (0.5, 1) even for ω2 slightly
larger than ωTBb2 . Then, by property 4 of Lemma 2 an equilibrium in (0, 0.5) that converges
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to 0 when ω2 converges to ω
TBb
2 from the right does not exist. This implies that the sequences
of bifurcations 4 and 6 are not possible. However, they can occur for b (1− d) < 1 and, by
Lemmas 1 and 2, they imply that either no locally asymptotically stable equilibrium exists
in (0, 1) for any value of ω2 ∈ (0, ω1) (it is the case of sequence 6) or it exists only for
ω2 ∈
(
0, ωFB12
)
(it is the case of sequence 4).
Since ωTB2 = ω
TBa
2 = ω
TBb
2 , the statement of the Lemma follows.
Proof of Lemma 3. By Lemma 2 (the last item), we know that xIl is the only steady
state of residential integration that can be locally asymptotically stable. Moreover, since xIl
is a steady state and it lies in (0, 0.5), we have
Π1
(
xIl
)− δ1 = Π2 (xIl )− δ2 (41)
Then, according to definition 1, xIl is sustainable if and only if
Π1
(
xIl
)− δ1 > 0 (42)
Since, xIl > d/2 implies (42), and condition (15) implies
Π1
(
xIl
)− δ1 > ω1√
ω2 + ω1
−
√
ω1
2
− ηd > 0 (43)
the statement of the lemma follows.
Proof of Proposition 1. Since each individual takes a stochastic residential decision
given the current state Nt = (N1,t, N2,t), the evolution of Nt and therefore of Xt is a
Markov process on the state space L ⊂ N2. We now show that if the population size in the
neighborhood nt = N1,t +N2,t is sufficiently large, then we can describe the joint evolution
of N1,t and N2,t and therefore of Xt by considering the deterministic dynamics generated
by the conditional expectation formation (see Dawid, 2007). Let us denote by {nt}∞t=0 with
nt = (n1,t, n2,t) the dynamical system generated by nt+1 = E [Nt+1|Nt = nt] . Given that
the probability of an individual household to choose the neighborhood over the outside option
is P(Π˜′i(nt) + εt > δ′i), where Π˜′i = Π˜j and δ′i = δj for all j of type i, and the noise terms
εt are assumed to be independent across periods and follow a logistic distribution with zero
mean represented by a cumulative distribution function Θ, we obtain two dynamic equations
describing the evolution of the number of households of type i residing in the neighborhood
over time, given by
ni,t+1 = 2Θ
(
Π˜′i (nt)− δ′i
)
ni,t where Θ
(
Π˜′i (nt)− δ′i
)
=
1
1 + exp
(
β
(
δ′i − Π˜′i (nt)
)) ,
(44)
with i = 1, 2. Then, one obtains a difference equation describing the deterministic residential
integration dynamics x˜t with
x˜t+1 =
x˜t
x˜t + (1− x˜t) 1+exp(β(δ
′
1−Π˜′1(nt)))
1+exp(β(δ′2−Π˜′2(nt)))
. (45)
Given that the probability of an individual household to choose the neighborhood is
P(Π˜i+εt > δi) and the error term εt is stochastically independent given state Nt = Y(Xt, nt)
and follows a logistic distribution with mean zero, from the standard law of large numbers
one can show that the following condition holds
lim
nt→∞
sup
Y(Xt,nt)∈L
[V ar [Ni,t+1|Nt = Y(Xt, nt)]] = 0 (46)
for i = {1, 2} and Xt ∈ [0, 1]. Then, following Proposition 3 and 4 in Dawid (2007), for any
given T and any given γ > 0 and ξ > 0 there is a minimal population size n¯ such that for
any nt > n¯:
P
(
max
t=1,...,T
|Ni,t − ni,t| > γ
)
< ξ ∀ N0 = n0 ∈ L and i ∈ {1, 2}. (47)
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Since the evolution of Ni,t can be approximated by ni,t for sufficiently large populations,
also the trajectory of x˜t can be used as an approximation of the trajectory of Xt.
Now let us note that δ1 = δ
′
1 and δ2 = δ
′
2. Hence, the Map (45) can be obtained
from (12) substituting Π1 (x) with Π˜
′
1 (x) and Π2 (x) with Π˜
′
2 (x). Then, since the results
about the dynamics of Map (12) in Theorems 1, 2, and 3 and Lemmas 2 and 3 depend
on ∆Π = δ1 − δ2 + (Π1 (x)−Π2 (x)) only and Π1 (x) − Π2 (x) = Π˜1 (x) − Π˜2 (x), the long
term dynamics of Map (12) and Map (45) are identical and the statement of the proposition
follows.
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